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Abstract 
Public participation in science, technology, and innovation is a significant trend in 
contemporary western democracies, which increasingly implicates the social scien-
tist in diverse ways. Yet, the question as to how social scientists actually engage in 
public participation, and how their engagements may be normatively justified, is 
not the object of systematic consideration in participatory frameworks and in ac-
tion-oriented social science. In this article, we ask how social scientists can take 
responsibility for their normative choices when engaging in participatory practice. 
Drawing on our experiences as researchers of public participation in nanotechnol-
ogies in Flanders (Belgium) and France, respectively, we reflectively consider our 
relationship with research subjects, the political relevance of our work, and the 
research problems we deal with. This leads us to articulate three modes of norma-
tivity that inform our commitments: a process mode, a critical mode, and a mode 
inspired by Actor Network Theory. Differentiating between these modes and gar-
nering sensitivity towards each mode’s characteristics opens the way to experi-
mentation with different types of normativity through which the social scientist 
accounts for his commitments and shifts or deepens his engagements in response 
to conflicting demands and real-world circumstances. Thus, rather than endorsing 
one approach to participation, we recommend a pragmatic attitude that implies 
systematic probing of the roles the social scientist assumes vis-à-vis other partici-
pants, interests, and objectives, and that enables him to continually adjust his po-
sition in view of the particularities of his situation. 
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1 Introduction 
“The integration of ethical concerns, 
innovation research and social sciences 
into nanosciences and nanotechnolo-
gies Research and Development will 
help build confidence in decision-
making related to the governance of 
nanosciences and nanotechnologies.” 
(CEC 2005: 9) 
Public participation in science and 
technology (S&T) is a significant trend 
in contemporary western democracies, 
which engenders new research collab-
orations and the building of new rela-
tionships between science and society. 
Yet, despite the widespread adoption 
of participatory discourses and prac-
tices, the terms and uses of “participa-
tion” are manifold and contested. In 
this article, we reflect on our engage-
ments as social scientists in ongoing 
processes of public involvement in new 
and emerging technologies. The ques-
tions we raise concern the shifting 
nature of roles (expert-non-expert, 
observer-participant), the interplay of 
different “knowledges” (scientific, so-
ciological, lay) in participatory pro-
cesses, and social researchers’ contri-
butions to innovation and research 
and development more broadly, as 
policy makers, natural scientists, and 
citizens call on us to take on responsi-
bilities beyond the traditional confines 
of academia. The quote above from the 
European Commission’s nano-
technology Action Plan is a case in 
point, as it proposes integrating social 
sciences into nanotechnology research 
and development in order to build 
public confidence in nano-related de-
cision-making. Yet, the extent to which 
social science can contribute to this 
aim, and whether or not it should, is 
debatable. More challengingly still, 
assuming that social scientists accept 
the invitation to play a role in the gov-
ernance of emerging technologies, 
how are they to proceed? 
These questions are further complicat-
ed by the fact that social scientists 
themselves increasingly instigate and 
coordinate participatory activities in 
S&T, for instance through consensus 
conferences and scenario workshops. 
This is distinctively the case with new 
and emerging technologies, where 
social researchers mobilize citizens 
and natural scientists in experiments 
with “anticipatory governance” 
(Barben et al. 2008) and provide partic-
ipatory expertise in potentially contro-
versial contexts (Joly and Kaufman 
2008). Often, these initiatives assume a 
scope, reach, and aims that differ from 
policy rationales. They can also differ 
considerably from one another.  
The multiplicity of engagement for-
mats and the variety of expectations 
and demands they entail, produces 
contradictions and uncertainties that 
are normative and political in charac-
ter, as actors seek both to justify and 
prescribe particular lines of action for 
others to follow, and organize them-
selves for mutual support. As these 
processes invariably implicate the so-
cial scientist in various ways, there is a 
need to empirically examine and con-
ceptually frame the forms of engage-
ment he enacts (Macnaghten et al. 
2005, Bennett and Sarewitz 2006). 
Thence, we ask ourselves how we re-
late to policy makers, citizens, natural 
scientists, and other social scientists in 
public participation. How should we 
engage with these actors and how 
should we study them? Under which 
conditions and on which grounds do 
we act? More broadly, how do we un-
derstand the political and normative 
significance of our work?  
In the field of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS), in which our research is 
situated, the questions posed above 
prove contentious. Critics argue that 
STS research fails to transform the 
ways in which science is done (Fuller 
2000) and that it cannot help us in 
answering the pressing political ques-
tion, What to do? (Radder 1998). While 
prominent STS scholars respond that 
their work is “political in the deepest 
sense” (Jasanoff 1996) as well as criti-
cally engaged, for instance because it 
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renders explicit competing claims in 
the production of rationality (Wynne 
1996), these responses by and large 
leave open the question of how the 
social scientist is to articulate norma-
tive positions or state claims vis-à-vis 
the actors he engages with. 
Recently, advances in addressing ques-
tions of this more explorative nature 
have been made, as STS analysts re-
flexively attend to the multiple and 
potentially conflicting roles they as-
sume in technoscientific collaborations 
(see e.g. Abels 2009, Doubleday 2007, 
Burchell 2009, Robinson 2010) and ask 
what it means to intervene in practice 
as an STS researcher (Zuiderent-Jerak 
and Jensen 2007). Increased attention 
is also given to the different ways in 
which STS scholars conceptualize 
technology, politics and participation, 
and to the political implications of 
using these concepts in particular 
ways (Wynne 2007, Nahuis and Van 
Lente 2008). Acknowledging, and re-
sponsive to, these tendencies in STS, 
this article is meant as a contribution 
to the growing body of literature that 
develops critically reflexive analyses of 
STS, often with the benefit of ethno-
graphic data, and questions the roles 
of social scientists in relation to public 
participation in S&T in particular. 
Our questions and concerns lead us to 
interrogate the reflexivity of the social 
scientist. Reflexivity, as it is deployed 
in this article, implies calling attention 
to the social scientist’s research and 
the practices he engages in. As we seek 
to illuminate normative aspects of so-
cial science research in particular, we 
ask how the researcher relates to the 
actors he studies, how his work is po-
litically relevant, and what kinds of 
research problems he deals with. Our 
use of the term is not to be confused 
with calls for reflexive analysis in an-
thropological and sociological litera-
ture, which demand that social scien-
tists make explicit their normative 
commitments by accounting for the 
funding they receive and how their 
work is mobilized, for instance.1 While 
such questions can be normatively and 
politically relevant, they are often 
asked with the aim of ensuring both 
the neutrality of the social scientist 
and the accuracy of his descriptions. 
Consequently, they fail to consider 
how representation and object of study 
are interdependent (Woolgar 1988). 
Nor do we propose continuous ques-
tioning of the social scientist’s position 
and interpretations to the extent that 
he becomes an ethnographer of his 
own involvement practice. While “con-
stitutive reflexivity,” as this kind of 
reflexivity is called (Woolgar 1988), can 
help to render explicit what social sci-
entists take for granted about their 
experiences and interpretative practic-
es, it provides them with little in the 
way of practical resources. We concur 
with Latour (1988a) that relentless 
probing of one’s own interpretations, 
knowledges and positions comes with 
the risk of being trapped in a “reflexivi-
ty loop” that restricts opportunities of 
becoming politically engaged. Thus, 
rather than disengaging from our re-
search in order to interpretatively ac-
count for it, we seek to develop a 
strong capacity for practical action, 
which is nonetheless steeped in reflec-
tion. 
In order to account for the different 
features of normativity that confront 
us, we distinguish three different 
modes of normative engagement that 
inform our researcher commitments: a 
process mode, a critical mode, and a 
mode inspired by Actor-Network Theo-
ry. Each of these modes constitutes a 
coherent expression of three dimen-
sions that define social scientific ac-
tivity: (1) the relationship of the social 
scientist with the actors he studies, (2) 
the political relevance of his work, and 
(3) the problem the social scientist 
                                                        
1 For anthropology, see e.g. (Clifford and 
Marcus 1986). In sociology, Bourdieu 
(1980) has called for “objectifying the ob-
jectification.” 
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deals with. Upon comparing our re-
sponses along each of these dimen-
sions, we contend that it is the ever-
changing and fluid interplay among 
modes that may fruitfully inform our 
future actions, as we shift between 
modes or deepen a particular approach 
with respect to a given context. In an 
attempt to offer ways to think about 
and handle the multiplicity of norma-
tive commitments, we propose the 
notion of experimental normativity, 
which we ground in classical pragma-
tism. More than a mode, experimental 
normativity is a pragmatic attitude 
towards engagement that implies sys-
tematic probing of the roles and con-
tributions social scientists assume 
throughout their engagements. As 
such, it is an attempt at empirical ex-
ploration of how the social scientist 
may articulate various normative posi-
tions or state claims vis-à-vis the ac-
tors he studies whilst he engages with 
them in ways that he believes are 
meaningful and responsible, and thus 
sufficiently reliable to inform his future 
actions.  
2 Two trajectories through partic-
ipation 
As our accounts suggest, public partic-
ipation in nanotechnologies is particu-
larly instructive to examine and rethink 
social researchers’ roles and commit-
ments, as these technologies are still 
at an early, undetermined stage of de-
velopment. Hence, they open a space 
for collective exploration and enact-
ment, which implicates diverse actors 
(citizens, scientists, and social re-
searchers) and topics (ranging from 
safety and risk concerns to governance 
issues) in unprecedented ways. In the 
two cases described in this article, 
collective exploration is made possible 
by means of formal, well-structured 
group dialogue, such as a citizens’ 
panel or a “Nanoforum” involving in-
novation actors and societal groups. 
The two cases also have in common 
that participatory initiatives often re-
ceive financial support from state bod-
ies, or are at the very least lauded by 
policy makers in Flanders and France, 
respectively, as a means of furthering 
socially responsible innovation. Yet, 
despite this shared public endorse-
ment of participatory mechanisms and 
despite significant overlap as to whom 
these mechanisms engage and how 
they are structured along participatory 
lines of inquiry, different problems and 
challenges surface in the interactions 
between participants and different 
kinds of discussion ensue. Accordingly, 
our responses as social scientists to 
the situations we encounter differ, and 
in fact lead us to ponder the kinds of 
questions participants are asked in the 
first place, to which ends they are 
asked these questions, and whether 
and how we can develop other fram-
ings of the issues, questions, and rela-
tionships at hand. 
2.1 Author 1: From process to critique 
I became involved in public participa-
tion in S&T as a social science re-
searcher to the Flemish participatory 
Technology Assessment (pTA) project 
“Nanotechnologies for Tomorrow’s 
Society” (NanoSoc). Although I had 
little knowledge of pTA at the time, I 
was intrigued by the idea of inviting 
outsiders to nanotechnology to partic-
ipate in its development and sympa-
thetic to the project’s aim of initiating 
dialogue events between scientists and 
publics (I was also looking for a job). 
Initially, I engaged in the project as an 
“observing participant”; i.e. as one of 
the social scientists who contributes 
directly to the endeavor by initiating 
participatory workshops, conducting 
interviews with experts, collecting and 
analyzing data, and writing up reports. 
In a later stage however, I switched to 
the role of “participant observer,” lead-
ing me first and foremost to observe 
and analyze actors’ interactions in the 
project without actively bringing in my 
own perspective. This was shortly after 
I obtained a research grant that per-
mitted me to do research more or less 
independently from NanoSoc. 
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My reasons for tentatively moving 
away from the project and the implica-
tions of doing so are elucidated below. 
Before turning to my experiences how-
ever, I should further qualify my un-
derstanding of “participant observer” 
as opposed to “observing participant,” 
as the duality between the two posi-
tions informs my commitments. Partic-
ipant observation, as I intend it, signi-
fies an inclination towards detached 
analysis that emphasizes observation 
rather than participation, albeit with-
out denying that the two are inextrica-
bly intertwined, as the observer cannot 
remove his observational traces. Simi-
larly, detachment does not imply that 
the researcher has no normative com-
mitments or social location; rather, it 
signifies an intention to a posture of 
non-alignment that brings “serious, 
sympathetic and critical attention to 
claims” as these are described into 
reality (Taves 2003). The distinction is 
an important one to make, as my in-
tention to restore a distance with par-
ticipants is largely at odds with the 
role many participatory approaches 
designate to the social scientist, par-
ticularly those that conceive of data 
generation and data interpretation as a 
joint enterprise to which all contribute 
through “co-operative inquiry” (Heron 
1996, Reason and Bradbury 2001). 
NanoSoc is but one of many pTA for-
mats that draw on this cooperative, 
action-oriented research paradigm. 
The language of “co-construction” that 
it speaks suggests that each actor has 
a stake in shaping technology and that 
everyone may be engaged in its craft-
ing through a process of mutual learn-
ing. This also includes the social scien-
tist, who is attributed the multiple re-
sponsibilities of initiating, facilitating, 
and analyzing participatory processes 
towards “socially robust” outcomes 
(Goorden et al. 2008a). Yet, one of the 
most obstinate problems I have faced 
is precisely how to combine these dif-
ferent roles, especially in instances 
where they tend to rule each other out. 
Hence, I have sought to come to terms 
with the methodological, political, and 
relational struggles I have experienced 
through the language of co-
construction and questioned the feasi-
bility of aligning initiation, facilitation, 
and analysis. 
Questioning the smart environment 
In 2007, social scientists in NanoSoc 
initiated a three-round Delphi study to 
which nanoscientists, “social experts,”2 
and citizens were asked to contribute 
short stories on the future of a smart 
environment with nanotechnologies. 
The aim of the study was to incite re-
flection on potential futures with 
“nano” in Flanders, taking partici-
pants’ visions and expectations as a 
starting point. Social scientists initiat-
ed and facilitated the rounds and also 
analyzed participants’ contributions by 
drawing out recurrent themes in the 
stories, assessed which actors and 
institutions were attributed which re-
sponsibilities, etc., but did not contrib-
ute narratives themselves. What struck 
me was how the vast majority of con-
tributions depicted technology users 
as highly autonomous and responsible 
consumers who are free to choose. 
Respondents envisaged consumers 
using smart gadgets such as intelligent 
fridges, “personal digital assistants,” 
intelligent underwear, and electronic 
labels on luggage in order to save 
themselves time, money, and frustra-
tion. Questions as to what causes time 
stress and frustration and how tech-
nology may incite anxiety were over-
looked. Hence, I raised these questions 
in a popular science magazine editorial 
(Van Oudheusden 2007). 
My urge here was to unearth assump-
tions about human needs and psy-
chology that are built into actors’ 
views on technologies, as well as to 
bring in voices not easily heard that 
                                                        
2 This category comprised social scientists 
from other departments and universities 
than ours, scientists in the liberal arts, in 
philosophy and the humanities, and vari-
ous types of professions, such as journal-
ists, politicians, and contemporary artists. 
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question common sociotechnical 
presentations. I saw a role for the so-
cial scientist in discerning forms of 
critique not readily provided and that 
were therefore not taken into account. 
As such, I also implicitly questioned 
the disposition of the social scientist in 
NanoSoc towards facilitation and anal-
ysis rather than (direct) engagement. 
In a report that followed the Delphi 
study, I argued that we were to give 
more consideration to questions about 
assumptions, norms, and expectations 
in the ensuing phases of the project, 
specifically given the aim of interactive 
TA (as I labeled the project at that 
time) of “moving beyond self-
containing perspectives and recursive 
practices that characterize a certain 
policy field or technology domain” 
(Loeber 2004) (Van Oudheusden et al. 
2007). 
Principlism versus narrative ethics 
To some extent, deeper issues about 
the smart environment surfaced in the 
following NanoSoc phase, which con-
sisted of three citizens’ panels of fif-
teen participants each.3 Panelists were 
asked to reflect on the nanotechnology 
futures that emerged in the first Na-
noSoc round, with the aim of inciting 
debate about potential developments, 
whether positive or negative. To make 
the workshop as concrete as possible, 
the NanoSoc research team had se-
lected two scenes from the “nanofu-
tures” in advance. These scenes were 
acted out by a professional actor and 
by participants themselves through 
role-playing. Questions laid out to the 
panelists included the following: How 
do the future worlds enacted in these 
plays differ from the ways in which you 
live and work today? How are they 
similar? What role does technology 
play in these future worlds? Which 
values are at play in these future 
worlds? Hence, the aim of the citizens’ 
panels was to engage citizens in fictive 
                                                        
3 Criteria for selection included gender, 
age, socioeconomic status, work and edu-
cational background. 
worlds to make explicit the values de-
picted therein and to have participants 
reflect on the changing nature of val-
ues over time. 
Shortly after the panel workshops, an 
issue of contention arose between 
social scientists as to how to analyze 
participants’ contributions. As the aim 
was to draw out citizens’ values in 
relation to nanotechnologies, a discus-
sion ensued on whether to adopt a 
“principlist” approach, which assumes 
that four overarching principles are 
central to moral life and which organ-
izes all values in relation to those prin-
ciples, or a narrative ethics, which 
stresses the relational and communi-
cative dimensions of moral situations 
(McCarthy 2003).4 
As with the Delphi study, I felt more 
inclined towards exploring citizens’ 
argumentations and challenging their 
views and norms, rather than attempt-
ing to organize moral beliefs and 
commitments according to predeter-
mined principles. In a paper I wrote 
with a colleague shortly after this re-
search phase, I argued that a narrative 
approach would provide a richer ap-
preciation of citizen values, as it has 
the potential to reveal the framings 
that produce claims rather than only 
considering whether there is agree-
ment or disagreement between them. 
To give an example, participants in the 
citizens’ panel on smart environment 
defined the overarching principle of 
autonomy both as a value and a dis-
value, depending on the situation at 
hand. One respondent argued that our 
increasing dependency on technology 
enables us to act independently (i.e. as 
free agents), as well as disables us to 
make decisions consciously and will-
fully without reliance on technology. 
Another respondent suggested that 
technology drives our need to become 
autonomous. Yet, the social situated-
ness of autonomy/dependency and the 
                                                        
4 More specifically, social scientists in Na-
noSoc deployed an ethical matrix, adapted 
to nanotechnologies. 
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Table 1: A process mode of normative engagement 
Relationship of the social scientist with 
the actors he studies 
Co-researcher or co-practitioner 
Political relevance of social scientific 
work 
Elucidating processes that produce 
more robust sociotechnical systems 
What is the problem the social scientist 
deals with 
Evaluating process or design 
mechanisms 
 
extent to which it generates ambigu-
ous responses to technology, received 
scarce attention in the initial principlist 
organization of the data. 
Furthermore, principlism itself per-
forms certain assumptions of what a 
citizen is, makes a distinction between 
the social and the personal, and be-
tween the human and the technologi-
cal. While these distinctions may well 
be necessary for participants to make 
sense of nanotechnology, I felt they 
ought to be debated. So my aim was 
not simply to discern values as if these 
corresponded directly with the data 
citizens provided us with, but to reveal 
some of the process of gathering and 
analyzing data itself by showing that a 
principlist approach purifies away in-
structive nuances. However, I also 
wondered whether a participatory 
framework that seeks to instigate 
harmonious co-construction permits 
delving into potentially controversial 
issues and differences between partici-
pants. 
Disrupting participation: critical nor-
mativity 
One may discern from the examples 
above a principle of inquiry in Na-
noSoc that orients actors’ contribu-
tions towards common action and 
solutions (e.g. an assumed common 
morality). Like pTA formats in general, 
procedures in NanoSoc are normative-
ly grounded in a commitment to delib-
eration and consensus seeking (e.g. 
Sclove 1995, Hamlett 2003). More spe-
cifically, pTA formats seek to initiate a 
process of co-management (or co-
construction) of technology to which 
various actors contribute their views 
and concerns so that widely supported 
outcomes may be obtained. Within this 
perspective, instigating an inclusive, 
accountable, and transparent proce-
dure matters as much as, or more 
than, the technological outcomes 
themselves (Nahuis and Van Lente 
2008).5 
Hence, the political relevance of the 
social scientist in pTA lies in elucidat-
ing processes that meet these criteria, 
which he sees as a prerequisite to pro-
ducing more robust sociotechnical 
systems. The core problem he deals 
with is evaluating the processes or 
design mechanisms that produce sys-
tems on those terms, usually with the 
intention of transferring the acquired 
knowledge to other settings and con-
texts.6 Table 1 summarizes this process 
mode of normative engagement. 
Without denying the importance of 
devising more inclusive procedures for 
sociotechnical decision-making, my 
                                                        
5 This emphasis on procedure does not 
imply that the substantive results of TA 
practice are irrelevant. Schot (2001) for 
instance argues that Constructive TA (CTA), 
which is linked to pTA, “is based on the 
assumption that CTA practices will eventu-
ally … produce outcomes more widely 
acceptable, with fewer adverse effects.” 
Nonetheless, pTA formats foreground the 
interaction between actors and the mutual 
exchange of viewpoints. 
6 In NanoSoc, the attempt to transfer pro-
cedural knowledge is implied in its mis-
sion: “The main objective of the research 
project Nanotechnologies for tomorrow’s 
society (NanoSoc) is to develop and try out 
an interactive process as a methodology in 
support of (nano)scientists and technolo-
gists when trying to incorporate societal 
expectations and issues as regards strate-
gic research decision making” (Goorden et 
al. 2008b). 
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Table 2: A critical mode of normative engagement 
Relationship of the social scientist with 
the actors he studies 
Critical distance (detachment)  
Political relevance of social scientific 
work 
Disrupting disciplines so as to open up  
spaces for alternative configurations 
What is the problem the social scientist 
deals with 
Providing criticism based on an 
interrogation of received views and 
commitments 
 
experiences in NanoSoc lead me to say 
that a firm commitment to co-inquiry 
has far-reaching political and episte-
mological implications that remain 
unaccounted for. For one, “pTA re-
searchers may be too preoccupied with 
accommodating various perspectives 
into a shared framework of action (...), 
thence leaving alternative and new 
understandings of notions unexplored” 
(Van Oudheusden 2011). In the first 
example above, dominant notions of 
smart environment remained unchal-
lenged in the interactions between 
participants. Moreover, when all actors 
are involved in decisions about content 
and method, as the co-inquiry para-
digm in its fullest form insists, critical 
questions as to whose assumptions 
define the smart environment and how 
it is deliberatively established remain 
not just to be answered, but need first 
to be recognized as significant. Com-
plementary to this political argument, 
one could argue that a critical assess-
ment of actors’ assumptions is a nec-
essary (albeit far from sufficient) con-
dition to incite a collective learning 
dynamic, as it requires actors to rec-
ognize and articulate their interests, 
concerns, and identities in view of 
competing understandings, possibly 
even moving them to revise their as-
sumptions in the process (Wilhelmson 
2002, Rip 1986). Lastly, one may ques-
tion the disposition of the social scien-
tist in NanoSoc in that he inevitably 
does set himself apart from partici-
pants, not just by abstaining from de-
bate in participatory events (as in the 
Delphi exercise), but also upon design-
ing the project’s data-gathering meth-
ods and extracting interpretations 
through them. My contention here is 
not that this disconnection sits uneasi-
ly with the principle of inclusiveness 
that is central to co-inquiry as such, 
but that it brings problems of owner-
ship, control, and power that remain 
unaddressed if the distinction is not 
acknowledged. 
The ramifications and inconsistencies I 
discern in the participatory approach 
explain my shift towards a critical 
mode of normative engagement that 
interrogates the assumptions, proce-
dures, and techniques that sustain 
NanoSoc and pTA at large, and that is 
more detached than participatory in 
character. Interrogation, as I see it, 
may be achieved by setting up contra-
dictions (principlism versus narrative 
ethics) and creating differences 
(searching for differentiation rather 
than agreement) that disrupt conven-
tions, codes, and principles. At best, 
critical analyses of this type produce 
translations between different registers 
that allow interruptions to the norm, 
for instance by taking the form of a 
principlist value assessment that is 
reflectively considerate of the discrim-
inating work it necessarily performs, 
and to some degree even inclines to-
wards narrative ethics. Hence, these 
interruptions may generate alterna-
tives alongside dominant practices. 
They become discourses that do not 
favor one account over another, but 
open up the possibility of difference.  
The critical mode I have sketched out 
is summarized in table 2. Although it is 
not new in terms of the methodologies 
it deploys and the normative commit-
ments it implies (in both respects it 
draws on the writings of Foucault and 
certain strands of STS itself; see e.g. 
Law 2004, Stirling 2008), I would argue 
that it remains to be fully enacted in 
relation to pTA practices and tech-
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niques. In the case of NanoSoc my 
interventions have incited debate 
among social scientists on questions 
of method and data gathering, on the 
relationships between project initiators 
and other parties, as well as on how to 
imagine and articulate the desired 
ends of the project. One nanotechnol-
ogist has repeatedly debated these 
questions with me as well, suggesting 
that in the interest of collaboration 
more time should be devoted to dis-
cussing with all participants the vari-
ous theoretical frameworks and opera-
tional terms upon which a pTA rests. 
It is important to recognize that the 
process mode and critical mode enact 
different concerns and interests that 
are by their very character difficult to 
draw together (e.g. the first is distinc-
tively problem oriented, whereas the 
second values critique of modes and 
actions). It is therefore probably inevi-
table that deconstructing participation 
in the manners described weighs on 
my relationships with colleagues and 
with project participants who assume 
shared problem definitions, or are ea-
ger to establish them in the interest of 
moving the project forward without 
delving into normative concerns. The 
bigger question to my mind, however, 
is whether and how the tensions and 
conflicts between social scientists and 
their “normativities” can somehow be 
productive. This point is addressed in 
the following section by way of other 
empirical examples, and picked up 
again in the conclusion. 
2.2 Author 2: Experimenting with me-
diation 
Over the past few years, I have been 
studying a French civil society organi-
zation by the name of Vivagora, which 
campaigns for the “democratization of 
science and technologies.” Created by 
science journalists in 2003, Vivagora 
has been particularly active in the field 
of nanotechnology. The association 
has organized public debates on nano-
technology, as well as intervened in 
public events organized or commis-
sioned by the French government. Due 
to its alignment with civil society and 
the expertise its members bring to the 
table, Vivagora is a relevant case to 
examine –one that opens a third mode 
of normative engagement.  
Vivagora’s initial initiatives included 
two series of public nanotechnology 
meetings (in Paris in 2005 and Greno-
ble in 2006). As my research focused 
on sociotechnical controversies and 
public participation, the organization 
quickly became one of my objects of 
study. In one of several papers, I de-
scribe how Vivagora articulates a vi-
sion of public participation that calls 
for the collective production of robust 
sociotechnical systems (Laurent 2007). 
Vivagora equally took an interest in my 
research and came to contact me on a 
more regular basis. However, as I 
gradually became more implicated in 
Vivagora activities, I was led to ques-
tion the nature of my engagement with 
the organization. I consider here some 
examples to illustrate different ways in 
which I negotiated relationships with 
Vivagora members, and thus the politi-
cal relevance of my work as a social 
scientist. 
Part of my research relates to the study 
of technological controversies in the 
field of ethics and the extent to which 
different forms of ethics produce dif-
ferent political arrangements. In a 
2010 article, I describe a pragmatist 
ethics that does not accept stabilized 
boundaries between a factual reality 
that can be assessed and values that 
are then mobilized to judge it norma-
tively (Laurent 2010). I argued that 
Vivagora articulates such a pragmatist 
ethics; a point the organization’s ad-
ministrator took note of and subse-
quently used to articulate her own 
position in a roundtable she was invit-
ed to. So in this instance, although the 
civil society organization was clearly 
an actor I was studying, my academic 
work enabled one of its members to 
more clearly state her position. My 
research thus contributed to “giving 
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voice,” so to speak, to one of the ac-
tors under study. 
Giving voice is a long-term concern of 
feminist studies that seek to expose 
the oppression of women in politics, 
science, art, etc. and do away with 
gender discrimination (Gorelick 1991). 
The use of this expression in terms of 
empowering dominated social groups 
has led to a somewhat romantic un-
derstanding of what it means (Rip 
2000). Yet my interactions with Vivago-
ra imply more than a desire to make 
heard the voices of those with fewer 
resources, be they financial, organiza-
tional, cognitive, etc. First, Vivagora 
does not need me to be heard – even if 
I occasionally manage to help the or-
ganization. Second, giving voice in this 
case is not just a matter of circulating 
existing positions that actors are sup-
posedly not aware of themselves, as 
another example may illustrate. The 
Citizen Alliance on Nanotechnology 
Issues (ACEN), which was launched in 
2010 following an initiative by Vivago-
ra, was expected to coordinate the 
work of several civil society organiza-
tions in nanotechnology and gather 
information about risk research and 
governance formats. As the project 
constituted an empirical site in the 
production of the public of nanotech-
nology, I professed my interest in 
ACEN in my conversations with Vi-
vagora members, who then called for 
my help as a “content expert” in the 
field of nanotechnology. As part of the 
work of the alliance was to gather in-
formation, content expertise amounted 
to advising what sort of information is 
to be acquired. The project could 
therefore be seen as an emerging col-
lective exploration: of the social to be 
enacted, of the identity of the civil so-
ciety organization itself, of my own 
position in the process, of what it 
means to have knowledge of nano-
technology. Giving voice here thus 
implies collective experimentation with 
the concerned actors. 
A third reason why giving voice, in the 
sense of empowering actors, is insuffi-
cient to account for my work with Vi-
vagora, is that the relationships are 
less one-way processes than constant 
interactions and adjustments, which 
require work from both sides. In some 
instances, these adjustments went 
smoothly so that empirical research 
and political involvement could come 
together in the same movement. A 
case in example is the Nanoforum, a 
participatory mechanism supported by 
the French Ministry of Health in which 
Vivagora also participated. In this in-
stance, I was asked to stand in the 
organizing committee on behalf of 
Vivagora when the administrator felt 
she needed someone to accompany 
her to meetings. I agreed to do so and 
explained to her that I wanted to con-
sider this site as an empirical object of 
study. Yet, in the course of my in-
volvement, I gradually engaged in dis-
cussions about potential topics for the 
forum. For instance, I insisted on polit-
ical instruments like nanoparticle la-
beling, as I believed such instruments 
to be good entry points through which 
pluralist political processes gain foot-
ing. In the somewhat informal organiz-
ing committee (in which other aca-
demics were also present and which 
did not have the rigid nature of a long-
standing administrative body) I could 
negotiate the specificities of my posi-
tion as both a member of Vivagora and 
as an academic and feel comfortable 
with the research setting I was a part 
of.7 Through my involvement, the fo-
rum evolved, as did Vivagora, which 
now focused less on organizing public 
meetings than on the collective moni-
toring of nanotech research. To give an 
example, in early 2010 Vivagora 
launched a project on collective exper-
tise, which drew in several civil society 
associations to jointly examine exist-
ing scientific literature and regulation 
on the use of nano titanium dioxide 
                                                        
7 I appear as co-author in a paper written 
by the members of the organizing commit-
tee of the Nanoforum (Dab et al. 2009). I 
also use this example in my academic 
work. 
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and nano silver coatings. Initiatives as 
these in turn shaped the research I 
was doing. In taking a more explicit 
interest in how participatory mecha-
nisms and devices are experimented 
with to answer complex, controversial 
or elusive public issues, I sought to 
answer how through experimentation 
“the citizen,” for instance, is redefined 
or potentially transformed. 
The relative ease with which I spoke 
with/for actors in Vivagora does not 
necessarily translate to other situa-
tions, however, especially when more 
traditional forms of representation are 
expected. Consider the following ex-
change between Vivagora’s adminis-
trator, M, and myself: 
M: We’re looking for someone to represent 
Vivagora at the meeting with DGCCRF (a 
French administrative office). 
L: I don’t know if I feel comfortable doing 
this… I don’t think I can advocate for Vi-
vagora’s positions. 
M: That’s always the problem with you 
academics… you know, we want to be in 
action. (...) You should take more responsi-
bility in the association. 
L: As I see it, I can contribute in my own 
way…8 
In this instance I refused to participate 
on the official terms set by the admin-
istrator. The example indicates that the 
nature of the relationship is perma-
nently at stake and needs to be ex-
plored through constant negotiations 
in which what is negotiated is itself in 
question. One can use the term “trial” 
here to describe the multiple situations 
in which uncertainty about the relative 
identities of the analyst and the actors 
is collectively explored (Latour 1988b). 
These relationships cannot be defined 
ex ante, as it is only through succes-
sive trials that they can be enacted. 
Hence, I cannot say in advance how I 
will position myself. 
Giving voice and negotiating a position 
In the work I do with Vivagora, giving 
voice is thus part of the job, in the 
                                                        
8 Phone conversation, October 16, 2008 
(my translation). 
sense that I believe my work contrib-
utes to making the actions of the or-
ganization more visible. As stated ear-
lier, making the work of actors visible 
is not just a matter of rendering explic-
it existing positions. Rather, it implies 
using my own repertoires to bring 
new, previously non-existent realities 
to life. 
To further elaborate this point, I turn 
to Actor-Network Theory (ANT). In an 
ANT perspective, enactment is a cen-
tral issue and concern to the sociolo-
gist. Callon uses the example of his 
work with the Association Française 
contre les Myopathies (AFM) to 
demonstrate how his involvement con-
tributed to the organizational evolu-
tion of the AFM through its explicit 
recognition that it could make a rele-
vant contribution to scientific research 
(Callon 1999). As this example indi-
cates, the nature of the social scientific 
contribution is to be found in the col-
lective formation of social and tech-
nical identities, which entails articulat-
ing social identities not previously 
considered or clearly formulated be-
forehand, as well as participating in 
the construction of sociotechnical 
concerns (e.g. genetic treatment of a 
rare disease). The social scientist is 
attached to specific actors in this pro-
cess, through which he enacts the so-
cial (Law and Urry 2004) and produces 
his own subjectivity (Gomart and Hen-
nion 1998). He contributes to the sta-
bilization of heterogeneous arrange-
ments, which consist of political com-
mitments (e.g. the definition of a pub-
lic concern), value judgments (e.g. the 
choice to mobilize for a particular is-
sue), and material devices (e.g. the 
layout of a participatory format). The 
collective exploration in my study of 
Vivagora and my interactions with the 
organization can be described as an 
ongoing process of enactment: both 
the members of Vivagora and I experi-
ment with our social identities. Con-
cretely, enactment comes about 
through the organization of participa-
tory activities such as the Nanoforum, 
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Table 3: An ANT derived mode of normative engagement 
Relationship of the social scientist with 
the actors he studies 
A mediator successively attached and 
detached  
Political relevance of social scientific 
work 
Making associations visible, thereby 
enacting them 
What is the problem the social scientist 
deals with 
Choosing emerging associations to 
study 
 
and mutual attempts to transform so-
ciotechnical concerns (such as nano-
particle labeling) into public issues. 
Practicing sociology then, is consid-
ered both a methodology for the social 
scientist and a form of action in the 
world that is always relational and 
process-oriented. Callon (1999), for 
instance, speaks of successive attach-
ments and detachments to describe his 
work with actors, thus implying that 
there is not one, fixed relationship 
between the researcher and his re-
search subjects. On the contrary, mo-
ments of proximity should alternate 
with distancing episodes. Yet, articu-
lating attachments and detachments is 
clearly not easy or straightforward. My 
own experience with Vivagora demon-
strates some of the difficulties it en-
tails. The dialogue quoted above can 
be read as an example where my at-
tempt to detach myself from certain 
actors is met with reluctance on both 
sides, as I am pressured into an en-
gagement that I do not believe in or 
wish to advocate. It demonstrates that 
remaining attached and detached re-
quires permanent adjustments with 
the actors in question and has to be 
tested and made more robust each 
time it is subjected to trials. 
In this perspective, the difference the 
social scientist seeks to make in the 
world is interwoven with the forms of 
the links with the actors he studies. In 
the process of enacting associations, 
social scientists ideally act as media-
tors between different worlds. Contrary 
to intermediaries, mediators transform 
the social while they circulate among 
actors (Latour 2005: 39). The meth-
odological position of the mediator as 
described by ANT goes with individual 
choices the social scientist makes as 
an academic researcher. His choices 
lead him to follow certain associations 
rather than others, providing resources 
to certain actors (those he studies), as 
much as they provide resources to him 
(Callon 1999). 
An ANT derived mode of normative 
engagement 
One can thus identify a mode of nor-
mative engagement derived from ANT, 
which appears relevant to account for 
some of the interactions with the ac-
tors I study and the form of normativi-
ty I articulate. The political relevance 
of this mode is to be found in the pro-
cess of making associations visible and 
explicit, in ways that also render visi-
ble to the world his own descriptions 
and analyses. The problem the scholar 
addresses is which association he 
wants to study, and thereby enact. In 
this mode, the social scientist acts as a 
successively attached and detached 
mediator. Table 3 summarizes the 
mode of normative engagement as 
derived from ANT. 
As my above experiences in the field of 
nanotechnologies suggest, it is not 
clear what the issues are and how they 
are to be dealt with, or what the roles 
are of social movements like Vivagora 
and those of researchers like me. 
Clearly, while public participation in 
nanotechnologies is still in the mak-
ing, there is room for exploration and 
collective enactment. Accordingly, as it 
is at times difficult to ensure the nec-
essary openness in the relationships 
with the actors under study, there is a 
need to refine understandings of ex-
perimentation, enactment, and media-
tion based on everyday practice and 
struggles with normativity.  
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Accounting for trajectories across 
modes 
Based on our experiences as social 
scientists with participation in S&T, we 
encountered a process mode, a critical 
mode, and an ANT-derived mode. Alt-
hough these modes are prominent in 
our research field, we do not contend 
to have described the entire landscape 
of normative positions. Rather, we 
have sought to account for a variety of 
positions the social scientist adopts 
when he circulates among the actors 
he studies or “moves about” (Rip 
2000). 
The two previous cases therefore de-
scribe trajectories, which the social 
scientist enacts. In the first example, 
the analyst is involved in a participa-
tory project to which he adopts a mode 
of normative engagement based on 
knowledge he acquires in the process. 
He shifts to a critical mode that allows 
him to make explicit issues not articu-
lated by the involved actors, specifical-
ly the politics embedded in the con-
duct of a pTA exercise. The second 
example illustrates the continuous 
adjustment and negotiation that is 
needed to articulate a position that 
“gives voice” and at the same time 
contributes to enacting the social. We 
believe it is important to account for 
these processes of trajectory making to 
enable a better understanding of the 
theoretical value of the position of 
social scientist, as well as the political 
relevance of his work.  
3 Experimental normativity 
In Reconstruction in philosophy, Dew-
ey (1920: 28-53) develops his analogy 
between the natural sciences and the 
human sciences. He argues that the 
natural sciences have learned to go 
beyond the hierarchy that privileges 
contemplative knowledge over practi-
cal knowledge. Scientists, argues Dew-
ey, do not passively observe nature to 
see if their ideas correspond to reality. 
Rather, they engage in an active exper-
imental process by controlling condi-
tions and manipulating the environ-
ment to test hypotheses and solve re-
al-life problems. With this view as his 
starting point, Dewey argues that the 
human sciences can gain relevant 
knowledge of the social by testing ide-
as and intuitions and also revising 
them in the light of new experiences, 
thus enabling humans and their envi-
ronments to continuously adjust to 
one another. He proposes an experi-
mental ethics that refuses general per-
spectives based on theoretical certain-
ties, instead advocating an ethics in 
“which the needs and conditions, the 
obstacles and resources, of situations 
are scrutinized in detail” (Dewey, 1920: 
174). Dewey’s position is close to 
James’s, for whom “ethical science 
just, like physical science, and instead 
of being deducible all at once from 
abstract principles, must simply bide 
its time, and be ready to revise its con-
clusions from day to day” (James 1897: 
208). 
Research in ethics, then, is research 
about methodologies and generating 
“effective methods of inquiry” (Dewey 
1920: 170). These methods produce 
knowledge about the world, as well as 
enable researchers to deal with situa-
tions that are potentially problematic 
for scholars and non-scholars alike. 
Dewey thus refuses the dualist per-
spective that separates a supposedly 
theoretical position from a politically 
relevant one, as it is through the inter-
vention of the object under study that 
an “amelioration” of the current situa-
tion can be reached. In fact, plans for 
improvement have to be worked out; a 
point to which we turn shortly. 
In further developing his experimental 
ethics, Dewey grounds research in-
quiry in experience, which for him en-
compasses both intellectual reflection 
and practical intervention. To convey 
this connectedness between reflection 
and action, he describes experience as 
“double-barreled” in that “it recogniz-
es in its primary integrity no division 
between act and material, subject and 
object, but contains them both in an 
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unanalyzed totality” (Dewey 1958: 8). 
Accordingly, experimental ethics refus-
es rigid categorizations and a priori 
dichotomies (subject/object, insid-
er/outsider, description/intervention) 
in so far that these arbitrarily reduce a 
set of multiple possibilities to one or 
two outcomes that are removed from 
actual human experience. For Dewey, 
philosophical intervention is thus best 
understood as an experimental pro-
cess rather than as a mobilization of a 
set of ready-made instruments. While 
the conclusions it produces can be 
more or less stable, these are always 
“liable to modification in the course of 
future experience” (James 1897: vii). 
In short, for pragmatists like Dewey 
and James, experience is a source for 
the constitution of knowledge and the 
construction of the social (Dewey 
1958, Dewey 1988). It is embodied in a 
process that gradually stabilizes reali-
ties, allowing once again for human 
action to proceed. The analogy with 
natural science is useful. For one, 
Dewey and James insist on the practi-
cal character of intervention in the 
human sciences, including ethics. Sec-
ond, pragmatism does not conceive of 
truth as a stable property, but sees it 
as a process through which a reality 
acquires validity (James 1978). Science 
studies, in turn, have demonstrated 
that scientific knowledge is based on 
successive trials (Latour 1988b). The 
notion of trial is also useful to account 
for the stabilization of the criteria that 
define what is morally good or bad 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 1991). Upon 
drawing together these lines of 
thought, experience emerges as a con-
stituent part of the processes that sta-
bilize technical and social realities. 
These processes, which comprise ma-
terial and moral trials, can therefore be 
labeled experimental. 
3.1 Reflection-in-action 
Upon considering our own research in 
the light of classical pragmatism, both 
James and Dewey direct our attention 
to the processes we engage in as re-
searchers of public participation. In 
insisting on the experimental character 
of these processes, and on the under-
standing that analysis and political 
intervention intertwine, they urge us 
not just to account for our research 
trajectories, but also to take seriously 
the challenge of defining the different 
forms under which intervention is pos-
sible. As our experiences with partici-
pation suggest, a variety of such forms 
are possible. For instance, the analyst 
may be too close to the actors he stud-
ies and may therefore want to restore 
a distance. Such action results from 
constant work and adjustments with 
the actors we study and cannot be 
described in terms of an epistemologi-
cal distance between the subject and 
the object of his inquiry. Instead, one 
has to consider a plurality of modes of 
engagement across which the analyst 
circulates.  
Accordingly, through experimentation 
the social scientist instigates relatively 
stable arrangements with the human 
and non-human actors he studies and 
works with, albeit in ways that lead to 
different answers for the researchers 
involved, as there is no unique way to 
“be normative.” Rather than choosing 
from a list of existing modes of norma-
tive engagement, the research process 
leads the social scientist to articulate 
specific modes that are more or less 
stable, in the sense that they allow him 
to both account for his empirical ex-
ploration, and take into account his 
expectations vis-à-vis those of the ac-
tors he studies. 
In this article the two empirical exam-
ples typified modes of normative en-
gagement that help characterize the 
type of intervention we see fit for our 
own case. They were not given to us in 
advance. Nor will they remain fixed or 
stagnant, but develop according to the 
particulars of situation. Accounting for 
these evolutions is part of the research 
process, and implies that we include in 
our future descriptions explanations as 
to how relationships were established, 
roles assumed and alliances devel-
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oped, as well as pinpoint the effects of 
our interventions on the actors and 
processes we engage with. 
Experimental normativity then, is the 
work that is needed to articulate for 
ourselves modes of normative en-
gagement based on continuous “re-
flection-in-action” (Schön 1987). We 
stress that reflection and action are 
interdependent to clarify a key differ-
ence between experimental normativi-
ty and “constitutive reflexivity” pre-
sented at the outset of this article. 
While the latter requires that the ana-
lyst detaches from himself and from 
his actions in order to identify what his 
underlying presuppositions and values 
are, we contend that values and rela-
tionships are constructed with the 
actors under modalities that are not 
given beforehand but need to be con-
tinually accounted for in the research 
process.9 
3.2 Against relativism 
Does our grounding of normativity in 
experimentation leave us with an ex-
treme relativism that consents to any 
form of intervention? Dewey sees ame-
lioration of the present situation as 
one of the aims of any work in ethics, 
yet he does not further develop the 
notion in Reconstruction in philosophy. 
For our purposes, we again invoke the 
concept of trial. Although it is conceiv-
able that certain modes of normative 
engagement incite instability, we em-
phasize that neither the type of rela-
tionship, nor the distance between 
analyst and research subjects, is a pre, 
but has to be experimented with in 
practice. This means that the analyst’s 
commitments and values (for instance, 
a desire to democratize technology) 
are not fixed, but constructed in a pro-
                                                        
9 To further clarify this difference: the re-
flexivity answer would imply that the ana-
lyst isolates punctual decisions and weighs 
the pros and cons of a given form of en-
gagement, while experimental normativity 
seeks to account for the continuous pro-
duction of particular forms of arrange-
ments. 
cess that simultaneously produces 
knowledge and normative engage-
ment. Seen in this way, the research-
er’s individual responsibility extends to 
the kinds of relations he manages with 
actors and to how he accounts in epis-
temological and normative terms for 
the particularities of his situation. Tri-
als thus lead to question more than 
relationships with individuals: they are 
“problematic situations,” as Dewey 
would say, in which public issues and 
social identities are interrogated at 
once, rather than separately. 
A second reason to distinguish exper-
imental normativity from relativism is 
that we conceive of knowledge accu-
mulation as learning processes. Revis-
ing the conclusions from day to day, as 
is necessary with experimental norma-
tivity, does not mean that research 
happens in a state of permanent insta-
bility. The two trajectories we de-
scribed are processes in which the 
analyst gradually learns about the ob-
ject he studies and acquires a social 
understanding of his relationships with 
involved actors. Hence, learning occurs 
about the situation the analyst studies 
and the type of normativity he articu-
lates. In addition, from the viewpoint 
of experimental normativity, learning 
again occurs through trials: of our 
relationships with the actors we study, 
of our positions with regards to our 
colleagues. Such knowledge accumu-
lation supposes that it is both possible 
and necessary to experiment, that the 
researcher accepts to put himself at 
risk. The notion of trial also suggests 
that learning is not necessarily a col-
laborative or harmonious enterprise, 
as the relationships between actors are 
not given from the start and often 
evoke resistance to social scientific 
intervention (Callon and Rabeharisoa 
2004, Vikkelsø 2007). In fact, learning 
may well agonize relations between 
actors (temporarily or even more per-
manently), for instance when the ana-
lyst distances himself from a certain 
kind of participation (trajectory 1) or 
refutes commitments that other actors 
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confer upon him (trajectory 2). Hence, 
experimental normativity is not about 
making purely subjective choices, but 
about ensuring the stability of a par-
ticular arrangement between the ana-
lyst and the actors he studies. As the 
two examples show, stability is not a 
permanent feature. As he faces new 
demands from the actors he studies, or 
attempts to articulate an explicitly crit-
ical stance, the social scientist may be 
led to enact other modes of normative 
engagement. “Stability” thus denotes 
an arrangement that is sufficiently 
reliable to inform our future actions. 
Having terminated a sequence of in-
quiry, we depend on “evidence already 
marshaled and constructive work al-
ready done” to experiment anew 
(Hickman 2009: 147). 
3.3 The political value of experimental 
normativity 
It should be clear from the emphasis 
we place on ongoing reflection-in-
action, flexibility, and the open-
endedness of social scientific engage-
ment that experimental normativity 
conveys the significance and useful-
ness of ambivalence in experimenta-
tion; that is, of situations where the 
social scientist has the possibility to 
navigate across different modes of 
normative engagement. In the two 
cases described in this article, the re-
searcher is caught up in existing ex-
pectations and forms of action, as we 
are both invited to engage as insiders 
on terms set by participation initiators, 
or assume a more descriptive role as 
outsiders. While the extent to which it 
is possible for us to work around these 
expectations (or even decline them) 
differs, our experimentations with 
normativity each suggest ways of mov-
ing beyond this implied insid-
er/outsider dichotomy and of thinking 
through individual and collective iden-
tities.  
Consequently, although we recognize 
the plurality of modes and their poten-
tially conflicting nature (as well as po-
tential overlaps between them), we 
first and foremost stress the need to 
explore with actors the types of en-
gagement that demand articulation in 
a given situation without prescribing 
which mode is more appropriate. Ex-
perimental normativity should be dis-
tinguished from a meta-mode that 
provides tools and rules for the man-
agement of the analyst’s normative 
engagement. It is best understood as 
an attitude that seeks to multiply ex-
periments, thereby displaying the nor-
mative modes at play and proposing 
new forms of arrangements with the 
actors in question. While experimental 
normativity does not provide a ra-
tionale to guide the social scientist in 
every circumstance, it does insist on 
the connections that he can draw be-
tween different empirical sites. Upon 
drawing these connections the social 
scientist can shape alternative forms of 
political action.  
What should be avoided is the a priori 
establishment of a distance between 
the analyst and the actors he studies. 
Rather, the social scientist must attend 
to the multiplicity of distances and 
critiques that arise from the particular-
ities of a problematic situation. As 
such, critique, whether distanced or of 
a more intimate kind, exemplifies a 
“mode of responding” to the concrete 
activities and challenges that emerge 
in research practice (Zuiderent-Jerak 
and Jensen 2007). It also recognizes 
the deeply political dimension of the 
engagement process: through negotia-
tions a relatively stable mode of nor-
mative engagement may emerge, 
which encapsulates the various roles 
and identities that both the analyst and 
the actors he studies assume in a par-
ticular situation. It is therefore crucial 
that the experimentalist in normativity 
is able to connect different sites and, 
through his scholarly production, shed 
light on multiple modalities, for in-
stance in the realm of public discus-
sions of science. And although these 
acts of connecting and describing may 
in some cases hold claims that are 
similar to the rationales that underpin 
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public participation in the first place 
(e.g. through the notions of collective 
experimentation and social learning 
encountered in pTA), the value of his 
social scientific work and significance 
of his political intervention lies in his 
capacity to account for this multiplici-
ty, as well as to decisively move across 
various modes of normative engage-
ment as he meets challenges on the 
way. 
4 Conclusion 
This article describes various forms of 
normative engagement the social sci-
entist enacts in public participation in 
science and technology. It discerns a 
process mode, a critical mode, and an 
Actor Network Theory inspired form of 
engagement, which we extract from 
our experiences as social scientists 
with public participation in nanotech-
nologies. With the aim of accounting 
for our normative commitments in 
research practice, we propose an ex-
perimental approach that negotiates 
between the various normativity reper-
toires starting from the particularities 
of our situations. Hence, we seek to 
come to grips with the issue of how 
the social scientist is to interact with 
the actors he studies, given the norma-
tive questions that arise through his 
engagements. Taking inspiration from 
classical pragmatists, we argue that 
these questions cannot be answered in 
the abstract, but require that the social 
researcher empirically explores his 
potential roles and contributions in a 
given setting and continuously ac-
counts for his experiments. 
We ground our normative reflections 
in our experiences with participatory 
initiatives in nanotechnologies. The 
multiplicity and variety of participatory 
initiatives in “nano,” and the uncer-
tainties related to the construction of 
“nano” publics and objects, enable, 
and compel, us to describe different 
forms of scholarly involvement. While 
we do not claim to have mapped out 
all the forms of social research in-
volvement, we do believe our analysis 
elucidates a variety of participation 
postures and suggests their potential. 
If the social scientist intends to exper-
iment with mediation for instance, as 
from an ANT perspective, empirical 
explorations of the diverse translation 
processes through which he enacts the 
social will be of much interest to him. 
They will also be necessary to account 
for the scholarly and political rele-
vance of his work. Researchers in par-
ticipatory technology assessment may 
in turn consider “mediation” as a 
means of reflexively attending to the 
roles they assume, and do not assume, 
in participatory spaces. 
For scholars of reflexivity more gener-
ally, our experiences open a “window 
on the world” (Rip 2003: 361) as they 
enable a wider debate on the values 
and interests that inform social in-
quiry. In the context of public partici-
pation in science and technology, 
where the roles of academic scholars 
vis-à-vis non-academic researchers 
and practitioners are not clearly de-
marcated, our reflections may be of 
use in that they help specify the char-
acter of scholarly contributions to the 
field. This specificity consists in ac-
counting for actions (e.g. shifting and 
deepening engagements) and situa-
tions in epistemological and normative 
terms without therefore dismissing the 
political alignments of the actors we 
study. While in the cases described 
above some professionals disproved of 
how we each problematized participa-
tion in our respective contexts, we 
contend that the modes we outline in 
this article, and how one negotiates 
between them, can serve action-
oriented actors as resources. For one, 
public engagement inevitably implies a 
blurring of different roles in practice 
(as we have seen), which renders the 
conventional distinction between prac-
titioner and analyst simply untenable 
(see also: Chilvers 2012). Second, given 
the political-economic significance of 
nanotechnology research, there is a 
real risk that all social sciences are 
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trivialized or instrumentalized through, 
or despite, participatory processes. 
Practitioners, as well as analysts, must 
therefore consider what is at stake for 
them. Drawing out normative differ-
ences between actors, programs, and 
instruments can contribute to this aim 
of mutually informed positioning and 
articulation. At the very least, such 
articulation would render participatory 
social science more socially accounta-
ble and politically resilient, analogous 
to how social scientific interventions in 
technology can render “scientific cul-
tures more self-aware of their own 
taken-for-granted expectations, vi-
sions, and imaginations” (Macnaghten 
et al. 2005). More importantly, it can 
enable social researchers to reflectively 
readjust and reposition themselves in 
the face of real-world challenges and 
concerns. Even if readjustments of this 
kind may not appear feasible, for in-
stance because the social scientist is 
obliged to play a particular role, it 
would be naïve to assume that his dis-
position will go uncontested in prac-
tice. As Abels (2009) contends in an-
swer to the question What role for 
social scientists in participation?, so-
cial scientists can, and already do, ex-
periment with different commitments 
and orientations because they must. It 
would therefore be a mistake to leave 
the practical and political implications 
of their commitments unexamined and 
unaccounted for.  
That being said, and having touched 
upon the weighty issues of normativity 
and politics in research, it is important 
to be modest about what our analyses 
and reflections may achieve, particu-
larly as the situations we describe are 
still in the making. Secondly, as exper-
imental normativity underscores the 
multiplicity of modes of knowledge 
production and engagements, experi-
mentation need not, and should not, 
be limited to the individual researcher 
or to our cases. One can hope that for 
one scholar who organizes public dis-
cussions, there will be another one 
providing a critique of them. For one 
social scientist calling for institutional 
reflexivity (Wynne 1993), another one 
will propose empirically based exami-
nations of social scientists who engage 
with natural scientists on the lab floor 
(e.g. Fisher 2007). Thus, as we describe 
the interventions of social scientists in 
participatory activities in nanotechnol-
ogy, we welcome others to examine, 
engage with, and question our in-
volvement practices and the experi-
mentation with modes that we find 
compelling and seek to articulate. 
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